From their own experience, the Taliban are too decentralized and too diverse a group to control themselves usefully. During the Eid ceasefire, while the Taliban chanted their ability to demonstrate control of violence, innocent Afghan civilians were killed and wounded by hundreds of people. We could negotiate directly with the Taliban of the Quetta Shura or Peshawar Shura, and yet we would have field commanders who would make independent decisions without any “official” discussions or agreements going on. Too often we treat this group as a homogeneous unit, although it is in fact a loose conglomerate of local tribal leadership, independent warlords, and separate or isolated cells. Any argument that the Taliban can control long-term violence is a fantasy. With a familiar bombast, we are told not to worry – that the United States, if it violates the terms of this agreement, will return to Afghanistan with overwhelming force. But what to do? Are you fighting the Taliban? Strengthen afghan security forces? And how many innocent Afghans will have perished in the meantime in this failed peace experiment? From a government that, in the last six months, has abandoned the Kurds of Syria and underestimated the Palestinians, it is hard to imagine a strategic U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan, when the Taliban inevitably violate the terms of this agreement, but just enough to harm the Afghans and not enough for our American forces to be redeployed. After nine rounds of negotiations, negotiators signed a peace agreement in February 2020 that addresses four main themes: “The agreement expressly invites the Taliban to engage with other Afghans in intra-Afghan negotiations, where they will discuss the modalities and date of a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire,” said a Foreign Ministry official. There is a lot of mistrust, decades of struggle, so it will not be easy. On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a peace agreement in Doha, Qatar, officially titled the “Afghanistan Peace Agreement.”  The provisions of the agreement include the withdrawal of all U.S.
and NATO troops from Afghanistan, a Taliban promise to prevent Al Qaeda from operating in as-controlled areas and talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.  The United States has agreed to reduce its initial level from 13,000 to 8,600 by July 2020, followed by a total withdrawal within 14 months if the Taliban meet their commitments.  The United States also committed to closing five military bases within 135 days and announced its intention to end economic sanctions against the Taliban by August 27, 2020.  The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan warned that a peace deal could risk the Taliban`s return to power, similar to the 1973 Paris Accords, which defeated the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government in the case of Saigon.   Pakistan warned that rising tensions in the Gulf region following the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani could affect the already delayed peace process between the United States and Afghanistan.  On 27 March 2020, the Afghan government announced the creation of a 21-member negotiating team for the peace talks. On March 29, the Taliban rejected the team on the grounds that “we will only be sitting in talks with a negotiating team that respects our agreements and is formed according to established principles.”  On 31 March 2020, a three-member Taliban delegation arrived in Kabul to discuss the release of the prisoners.  They are the first Taliban representatives to visit Kabul since 2001.  The Afghan government had also agreed to conduct the talks at Bagram prison.  However, on the same day, the Afghan government announced that the Taliban`s refusal to accept a new ceasefire and the Taliban delegation`s refusal to appear in prison on the scheduled date had both led to the postponement of the prisoner exchange.
   After the arrival of the Taliban delegation, a senior Afghan government declared